The return of imperialist aggression to Europe has shaken its people and its armies to the core. The Russian war on Ukraine shows us how radically the battlefield is changing and that European armies are not ready for this change.
In the first phase of the conflict, the focus was mainly on hardware. The reflex in most countries was to counter mass with more mass. Ukraine received much needed vehicles and weapons along with intelligence products. Western nations launched large budgets to procure more tanks, guns, and ammunition — conventional warfighting equipment.
Twelve months later we have had to learn: Mass remains important, but it is through digitised and networked forces that Ukraine , although largely improvised, has managed to counter the Russian attack. Software systems such as GIS Arta allowed Ukraine to carefully marshal its resources across large and geographically disconnected fronts. Software has enabled local numerical superiority in artillery to be achieved at a place and time of a commander’s choosing. In some cases, this proved successful even when Ukrainian forces were outnumbered 12:1.
In short: We can learn that dominance in information and, thus, speed and precision, can win over dominance in numbers. This is precisely the idea that Helsing was founded upon. The West needs to dominate software and artificial intelligence (AI) if it wants to keep the upper hand in defending its democratic values and way of life.
Why is that?
If speed and precision of reconnaissance, decision making, and effects are decisive, software and especially AI take on a crucial role in conferring battlefield dominance. Receiving and analysing information at speed results in superiority in command, control, and effect. Furthermore, intelligent networking, especially with medium to small sized forces, is crucial in modern warfare where dispersion is key. For collective defence the additional requirements are interoperability and the ability to quickly share mission critical data such as target coordinates. The use of powerful technologies such as AI in combination with smaller, more agile platforms will dominate static mass by a factor of 10:1. It is no longer the large eating the small, but the fast eat the slow.
What does this mean in practice?
I believe that we can learn four lessons from Ukraine:
- Speed is the new mass — functional chains from sensors over decision makers to effectors must be closed as quickly as possible. They must be able to interact with multiple hardware systems on the one hand and efficiently couple a multitude of dislocated targets with available effectors on the other. The GIS Arta software used by the Ukrainian armed forces is a case in point: sensors and effectors can be integrated in a plug-and-play manner, reducing targeting cycles from 20 minutes to less than one.
- Adaptability becomes key — every digital measure will lead to a digital countermeasure. The Russian armed forces are continuously developing their capabilities and adapting to tactical conditions. Next to conventional camouflage we now see new, rather sophisticated camouflage, such as radar reflectors for faking bridges, being used. Adaptive capabilities are thus needed to close emerging capability gaps within days, not years — not only for new systems, but existing systems too. In uncertain times, adaptability is the best strategy. In software terms, adaptability is delivered through an integrated backend infrastructure that can deploy new capabilities from the cloud to edge in almost real-time.
- Software adds efficiency — Artillery plays a strategic role in the Ukraine’s defence. UAV-guided indirect fire is the result of adaptation that has allowed targeting cycles to be closed faster. It has also led to improvements in the precision and efficiency of artillery munitions. Software and AI are enabling the integration of various UAV and indirect fire systems like mortars and self-propelled howitzers. Once arduous, long, and error-prone processes are now run through more quickly and with significantly greater precision — especially in GNSS-denied environments. This is resulting in faster artillery strikes with greater precision and more munitions efficiency. This is crucial in the current state of war, where efficiency is key.
- The New Defence ecosystem is decisive — on the Ukrainian side, but also in western support for Ukraine, it is clear that new companies in the security and defence industry in particular are making a significant contribution to Ukraine’s defence capability. This is due to the software focus of these companies and their agile approach to deploying capabilities. At the same time, these companies are successfully developing capabilities in partnership with established primes — after all, deeptech alone cannot win wars.
It is precisely for the challenges and solutions described here that Helsing was founded as a new defence company with a focus on AI: Optimising mission-specific functional chains through real-time information processing, cognitive applications and adaptive capability management through a scalable AI infrastructure. All this in partnership and close cooperation with established industrial partners and those who truly matter: the soldiers for whom the “last mile” will always be the “first mile”.
The war in Ukraine is offering many lessons — to us and our adversaries. We must not only recognise these lessons but implement them; In our technology, our doctrine, and in our whole approach to 21st century conflict. Failure to do so will leave us unable to deter and defend ourselves. The consensus from this year’s Munich Security Conference was clear. Thefuture of the world order depends on the outcome in Ukraine. Software and AI will be the key to shaping that outcome in favour of our democracies, and in deterring future aggression from our adversaries.